OLAF and Polish authorities uncover major VAT import fraud scheme

Press release no. 10/2025
PDF version 

This press release is also available in Polish.  

Close cooperation between the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) and Polish national authorities has led to the uncovering of a sophisticated VAT fraud scheme involving goods imported from China into the European Union. Acting on intelligence and information provided by OLAF, Polish authorities carried out a criminal investigation, resulting in the arrest of four individuals and searches at 50 locations across the country.

Working closely with customs and fiscal authorities in Poland, Germany, Czechia, Lithuania, and Latvia, OLAF identified a complex network exploiting the so-called "customs procedure 42"—a mechanism that allows for deferred VAT payments on goods imported into one Member State and transported to another.

The suspected fraudsters transported goods arriving from China via railway border crossings into Germany under a customs transit procedure, suspending customs duties and VAT. Once in Germany, the goods were declared under procedure 42, only to be transported back to Poland and stored in warehouses near Wólka Kosowska, a major commercial hub.

Operating through transport companies, logistics providers, and dozens of shell companies, the perpetrators falsely documented exports to other EU countries, mainly Lithuania. In reality, the goods remained in Poland or were illicitly distributed across the EU, including to Germany, Spain, France, and Italy—allowing for systematic evasion of VAT and the generation of significant illicit profits.

The fraudulent activities were orchestrated by an organised group, operating behind a network of shell companies registered under the names of Lithuanian, Ukrainian, and Russian nationals.

Following OLAF’s referral, the Regional Prosecutor's Office in Kraków launched a criminal investigation. On 8 April 2025, Polish authorities—including officers from the Internal Security Agency (ABW), the National Revenue Administration (KAS), the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBŚP), and the Central Cybercrime Bureau (CBZC)—carried out an extensive enforcement operation.

In addition to the four individuals that were arrested, authorities seized telephones, computers, data carriers, financial and accounting documentation, and almost 300 company stamps. Property was also temporarily seized. 

The detainees have been charged with participation in an organised criminal group, money laundering, and falsification of legal documents. At the request of the prosecutor’s office, the District Court for Kraków-Śródmieście ordered their temporary detention for three months.

OLAF Director-General Ville Itälä said: “This case is a clear example of how cross-border cooperation and intelligence-sharing are crucial in protecting the EU’s financial interests. Through close cooperation with national authorities, we can uncover even the most complex fraud schemes. We remain fully committed to supporting Member States in the fight against fraud and ensuring that those who seek to exploit our systems are caught and held fully accountable.”

You can read more in the press release from the Regional Prosecutor's Office in Kraków 

_{OLAF mission, mandate and competences:
OLAF’s mission is to detect, investigate and stop fraud with EU funds.}    

_{OLAF fulfils its mission by:
•    carrying out independent investigations into fraud and corruption involving EU funds, so as to ensure that all EU taxpayers’ money reaches projects that can create jobs and growth in Europe;
•    contributing to strengthening citizens’ trust in the EU Institutions by investigating serious misconduct by EU staff and members of the EU Institutions;
•    developing a sound EU anti-fraud policy.}

_{In its independent investigative function, OLAF can investigate matters relating to fraud, corruption and other offences affecting the EU financial interests concerning:
•    all EU expenditure: the main spending categories are Structural Funds, agricultural policy and rural development funds, direct expenditure and external aid;
•    some areas of EU revenue, mainly customs duties;
•    suspicions of serious misconduct by EU staff and members of the EU institutions.}

_{Once OLAF has completed its investigation, it is for the competent EU and national authorities to examine and decide on the follow-up of OLAF’s recommendations. All persons concerned are presumed to be innocent until proven guilty in a competent national or EU court of law.}

For further details:

Pierluigi CATERINO
Spokesperson
European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF)
Phone: +32(0)2 29-52335  
Email: olaf-mediaec [dot] europa [dot] eu (olaf-media[at]ec[dot]europa[dot]eu)
https://anti-fraud.ec.europa.eu
LinkedIn: European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF)
Bluesky: euantifraud.bsky.social

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